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Abstract 
We construct an overlapping generations model in which parents vote on the 
tax rate that determines publicly provided education and offspring choose their 
effort in learning activities. The technology governing the accumulation of 
human capital allows these decisions to be strategic complements. In the 
presence of coordination failure, indeterminacy and, possibly, growth volatility 
emerge. This indeterminacy can be eliminated by an institutional mechanism 
that commits to a minimum level of public education provision. Given that, in 
the latter case, the economy moves along a uniquely determined balanced 
growth path, we argue that such structural differences can account for the 
negative correlation between volatility and growth.   
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1   Introduction 
Investment in formal education is one of the most important intergenerational transfers. It is 
considered as a key factor of economic growth and income distribution. Several aspects of 
this investment have been analysed in the literature. For example, Glomm and Ravikumar 
(1992) examine the effects of public and private education on long-run growth and 
inequality. Bénabou (1996) considers how the growth performance of an economy is 
influenced by the degree of decentralization of government funding for education. 
Blankenau and Simpson (2004) show conditions under which the effect of public education 
spending on growth may be non-monotonic. Cremer and Pestieau (2006) study the design of 
optimal education policy. Finally, Kempf and Moizeau (2009) investigate the link between 
social segmentation, inequality and growth in an environment where education is a club 
good.  
     This paper complements the existing literature by highlighting the fact that, unlike the 
production of physical capital, the education process involves the decisions of two 
consecutive generations, parents and children. The first generation, parents/tax payers, 
provides the resources for education (e.g., teachers’ salaries, buildings, equipment, etc.) and 
the second, children/students, the time and effort that are necessary to absorb knowledge. 
Moreover, insofar as the actions by one generation affect the outcome for the other, one of 
the important characteristics that may affect each generation’s decisions and actions is its 
reflection of how the other will decide and act. Put differently, the education process entails 
the coordination of the decisions made by two generations, which may be strategic 
complements (see, Cooper and John 1988).1    
     The idea that there may be a coordination game inherent in the accumulation of human 
capital seems particularly relevant in the case of public education, where decisions are often 
made collectively by a large number of individuals through voting. More specifically, the 
voters’ support towards public investment for education may depend on the extent to which 
the younger generation will provide the learning effort necessary for allowing them to ‘reap’ 
the benefits associated with more widely spread and qualitatively improved education 
services. Nevertheless, the return to the young generation’s learning effort may be partially 
                                                 
1 Strategic complementarity “implies that an increase in the action of all agents except agent i increases the 
marginal return to agent i’s action” (Cooper and John, 1988; p. 445). Hence agent i will respond by raising her 
activity level. 
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determined by the qualitative characteristics of the education sector – characteristics that 
depend on public investment. One expects that such cross-generational interactions will 
have important repercussions for human capital accumulation and, consequently, economic 
growth. Nevertheless, the aforementioned literature on public education and growth has 
largely neglected the strategic complementarities that are inherent to decisions of coexisting 
cohorts of agents with different objectives – decisions which jointly determine the formation 
of human capital.  
     Our analysis builds upon an overlapping generations model in which the engine of 
growth is the accumulation of human capital. The actions of both young (offspring) and 
adults (parents) affect the formation of human capital. In particular, the parents vote on the 
tax rate that determines the revenue available to the government for the provision of public 
education, while the offspring decide on the effort they devote towards learning activities. 
The technology governing the evolution of human capital allows these decisions to be 
strategic complements. Specifically, in equilibrium, the effort devoted by the young is an 
increasing function of the tax rate chosen by parents which, by itself, is an increasing 
function of the offspring’s learning effort. 
     First, we show that a coordination failure may arise and multiple equilibria emerge. These 
equilibria are Pareto-ranked. They include an equilibrium in which both cohorts choose no 
provision (i.e., no effort by offspring and a zero tax rate chosen by parents), and equilibria 
entailing positive effort by the young and a positive tax rate by the adult voters.  Thus, as in 
Redding (1996) and Palivos (2001) among others, our paper provides an explanation for the 
persistent disparities in the world distribution of incomes and growth rates, which differs 
from the “path dependence” hypothesis – a hypothesis that has been criticized on the basis 
that many industrialized countries did not happen to be rich at the initial stages of their 
development and yet the managed to cross the threshold level. 2 Why is it that currently poor 
countries cannot cross it?  
     Naturally, the idea that multiple growth paths may be attributed to failures of 
coordination offers support for some type of government intervention (be it in terms of 
economic policy or a more structural/institutional reform) that is designed to induce the 
                                                 
2 Examples of path-dependent multiple equilibria are provided in the analyses of Azariadis and Drazen (1990), 
Galor and Zeira (1993), Ceroni (2001) and Chakraborty (2004) among others. For evidence regarding the 
existence of convergence clubs, see, for example, Quah (1997) and Canova (2004).   
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selection of the economically/socially “preferable” equilibrium. For this reason, we 
subsequently consider an institutional reform that could induce the selection of the “high 
growth/high welfare” equilibrium. In particular, we show that the commitment to a 
sufficiently high tax can achieve this objective and, therefore, eliminate growth 
indeterminacy. 
     In addition to the above, we are able to show that one of the most pervasive empirical 
regularities in macroeconomic data, the negative relation between output growth and its 
volatility, can be attributed to the intergenerational complementarities as well as to the public 
sector’s institutional arrangements.3 The explanation we offer works as follows. The 
existence of multiple growth equilibria possesses an additional explanatory power when it 
comes to the overall macroeconomic performance. In a dynamic setting, there is nothing to 
preclude the possibility that in some periods agents may choose actions associated with high 
growth while in other periods they may choose actions associated with low growth. Periods 
of strong economic activity may be followed by periods of weak economic activity and vice 
versa, depending on how some agents expect others to behave and act. Thus, growth 
indeterminacy is inherently linked with the idea of growth volatility. We show that the 
average growth rate in this case is lower compared to the uniquely determined growth rate 
that emerges in the presence of a minimum commitment to public education.   
     By providing an alternative suggestion, our analysis may be viewed as complementary to a 
series of theoretical papers that employ stochastic growth models in order to examine the 
impact of public policy on the growth-volatility nexus (e.g., Turnovsky, 2000; Blackburn and 
Pelloni, 2004; Chatterjee et al., 2004; Varvarigos, 2007). In these models, exogenous variations 
in policy parameters cause changes in both the average growth rate and its volatility. In 
contrast, we attribute this relation to the structural characteristics pertaining to the endogenous 
determination of public policy.  
     The implications from our model share some similarities with those in the interesting and 
important, but largely neglected, paper of Glomm and Ravikumar (1995). They also show 
that the presence of endogenously determined public spending may generate, rather than 
eliminate, equilibrium indeterminacy, sending thus a cautionary message regarding the role of 
public policy. Nevertheless, there are also significant differences between their analysis and 
                                                 
3 Evidence on the negative relation between output growth and its volatility is provided by Turnovsky and 
Chattopadhyay (2003), Hnatkovska and Loayza (2005) and Badinger (2010) among others. 
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ours. Firstly, they do not examine the relation between growth and volatility as we do in this 
paper. Secondly, the mechanism leading to their result is different as it rests on the ideas 
that, (i) the young generation’s education effort depends on the expectation of the future tax 
rate that will be chosen by the same generation when it becomes old, and (ii) the chosen tax 
rate depends on aggregate human capital due to the fact that the ‘warm glow’ argument in 
the utility function is introduced with CRRA coefficient which is different in comparison to 
the one attached to the remaining utility arguments; therefore, their result is not due to 
strategic complementarities in the decision making process of two distinct cohorts of agents. 
Put differently, we find multiple equilibria even with simple functional forms that imply 
uniqueness in their model. Moreover, equilibria cannot be Pareto ranked in their model, 
whereas, in our case, the high-growth equilibrium yields higher welfare. Finally, when their 
parameter values allow multiple equilibria, they find an inverse relation between the tax rate 
and income. In contrast, our model shows that the high-growth equilibrium actually 
corresponds to the relatively high tax rate.  
     Although this last result appears to be in contrast to conventional wisdom, it is not 
completely at odds with existing empirical evidence, especially when considering the 
productive use of tax receipts in our model. While many analyses are unable to derive a 
decisive conclusion on the growth effects of taxation and public spending – see Myles 
(2000), Agell et al. (2006) and Bania et al. (2007) for example – when econometric methods 
account for the productive use of public spending (infrastructure investment, education etc.) 
then there is supportive evidence of positive effects from taxation/public spending to 
economic growth (e.g., Mofidi and Stone, 1990; Pereira, 1998; Kneller et al., 1998; Cohen and 
Paul, 2004). In fact, in his survey of the relevant literature, Poot (2000) claims that “the most 
conclusive results in the literature relate to the positive impact of education expenditures on 
growth” (Poot, 2000; p. 516) – thus, providing further support on this element of our 
results.        
     The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the general set-up of the 
model. Section 3 establishes the existence of multiple equilibria and analyzes its implications. 
Section 4 shows that growth indeterminacy can be eliminated with partial commitment on 
behalf of the government. Section 5 examines the same issue under alternative arrangements 
regarding the agents’ timing of choices. Section 6 concludes. 
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2   The Basic Structure 
We consider an overlapping generations economy in which time is discrete and indexed by 
0,1, 2...t = . Each period, a cohort of unit mass is born. Agents within the cohort are 
identical and live for two periods. They are ‘young’ (or ‘offspring’) in the first period of their 
lifetime and ‘old adults’ (or ‘parents’) in the second. All agents are endowed with one unit of 
time in each period. The young allocate it between activities that augment their human 
capital (e.g., formal schooling) and leisure. The old, on other hand, supply their time, 
combined with their human capital (determining knowledge, efficiency and expertise), 
inelastically to firms in exchange for the prevailing market wage. Adults are also ‘voters’ in 
the sense that they cast a vote on their preferred tax rate that the government imposes on 
their labour income. Their disposable income (i.e., the residual after taxation) finances their 
consumption. The revenues collected by the government are utilised so as to finance 
activities that support the qualitative characteristics of education (e.g., the quality of 
schools/colleges/universities, scholarships, research and teaching support etc.) and, 
therefore, promote the formation of human capital. The government abides by a balanced-
budget rule each period.  
     An agent born in period t  enjoys utility over her whole lifetime according to4   
 1 2 2ln(1 ) ln( ) ln( )
t
t t t tu e c w h+ + += − + + , (1) 
where te  denotes schooling effort when young and 1tc +  denotes consumption when old.
5 We 
implicitly assume that children’s consumption is incorporated into the consumption of 
parents. The last term of the utility function indicates that parents are imperfectly altruistic 
towards their offspring. Specifically, a parent gets satisfaction from her offspring’s realised 
income. This is meant to capture the idea that parents care about their offspring’s future 
prospects and social status (both being enhanced through more advanced knowledge and/or 
increased income).      
     We assume that, when young, a person can pick up a fraction (0,1)v ∈  of the existing 
(average) level of human capital tH  without effort. This may happen, for example, through 
                                                 
4 We choose equal weights in the utility function purely for simplicity. The more general case is analysed in 
Palivos and Varvarigos (2009).  
5 The superscript t  on the left-hand side indicates the time of birth of the generation enjoying utility through 
this function. A similar notation applies to other functions below. 
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some type of home tutoring or by simple observation. The government provides goods and 
services that increase the potential human capital that a young person can acquire even 
further. Nevertheless, the young person must provide resources that take the form of effort 
(or foregone leisure), denoted by te , in order to benefit from the government’s offer of 
education. Specifically, the formation of human capital takes place according to the learning 
technology6  
 1t t t th vH φg e+ = + , (2) 
where tg  denotes public expenditure per student and the parameter 0φ >  captures the 
efficiency of the public education system.7 
      All adults are liable to income taxation. Therefore, they will meet their consumption 
needs out of their disposable income. Thus, the budget constraint during adulthood is     
 1 1 1 1(1 )t t t tc τ w h+ + + += − . (3) 
     The government finances the provision of goods and services towards education by 
utilising its total revenue from labour income taxation t t tτ w H . Given that there is a unit 
mass of young agents and the population size remains constant, spending per student 
corresponds to  
 t t t tg τ w H= . (4) 
     The single and perishable consumption good that exists in this economy is produced and 
supplied by perfectly competitive firms, who employ efficient labour so as to produce tY  
units of output according to  
 t tY AH= ,   0A > . (5)  
Notice that besides the level of human capital, tH  also corresponds to the economy’s 
available units of efficient labour, because adult agents (whose large population is normalised 
                                                 
6 This technology for the accumulation of human capital shares common features with de Gregorio and Kim 
(2000) and Ceroni (2001) among others. However, none of these have combined both effort (by offspring) and 
endogenously determined resources (by voters and the public sector) as complementary inputs within the same 
type of technology. Glomm and Ravikumar (1992, 1995) include both types of inputs in the formation of 
human capital, but they also assume that each input is essential for a positive stock of human capital.       
7 We assume a linear effect for tg  to guarantee an equilibrium with ongoing output growth. Recall that when 
an agent chooses te , she takes the effect of tg  as given, because this term is determined by old agents. 
Therefore, we can consider t tφg e  as a composite input, in the same manner as we do for efficient labour in 
models with endogenously determined accumulation of human capital, without worrying about implications of 
maximisation under increasing returns.    
 
 7
to one) supply one unit of ‘raw’ time each. Profit maximisation implies that the equilibrium 
market wage per unit of (efficient) labour is tw A=  t∀ .   
     As indicated earlier, the electorate is comprised by the adults who cast a vote on their 
preferred tax rate. Therefore, the problem of an agent born it t  is to choose te , 1tc +  and 1tτ +  
so as to maximise (1) subject to (2), (3), (4), 0 1te≤ ≤ , 10 1tτ +≤ ≤ , and 1 0tc + ≥ , taking tH , 
1tH + , tw , 1tw +  and 2tw +  as given. Of course, given that individuals are identical, the tax rate 
chosen by the representative parent is the one that will prevail in a democratic regime. 
Equivalently, we can substitute (2)-(4) in (1) and write lifetime utility as  
 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1ln(1 ) ln[(1 ) ( )] ln[ ( )]
t
t t t t t t t t t t t t t tu e τ w vH φe τ w H w vH φe τ w H+ + + + + + + += − + − + + + . (6) 
     It is straightforward to check that the FOC associated with the problem of an individual 
who was born in period t can be eventually written as  
 1 ,    0
1
t t t
t
t t t t t t
φτ w H e
e vH φτ w H e
≥ ≥− + , (7) 
and 
 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 ,    0
1
t t t
t
t t t t t t
φw H e
τ
τ vH φτ w H e
+ + +
+
+ + + + + +
≥ ≥− + , (8) 
with complementary slackness in both (7) and (8). Notice that we can use (8) to infer the tax 
rate that will be chosen by adults who were born in period 1t −  (that is, the parents of 
agents born in period t ).     
 
3   Equilibrium Analysis  
In this section we establish the existence of multiple equilibria and analyse their implications 
for macroeconomic outcomes as well as for institutional arrangements pertaining to public 
policy.   
 
3.1   Multiplicity of Equilibria 
We can view the situation described here as a game played between each pair of consecutive 
generations, that is, between parents and children. Each agent plays this game twice, once as 
a child and once as a parent. In any period t , a parent, who was born in period 1t − ,  
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chooses the amount of resources that will be allocated to public education by casting a vote 
on the preferred tax rate tτ . At the same time, the child chooses the amount of her time, or 
equivalently her effort, te , that she will devote on schooling. Nevertheless, when deciding 
her choice variable, each player takes the action of the other player as given. If we substitute 
the equilibrium conditions t th H=  and tw A=  in equations (7) and (8), both dated in 
period t , and take into account the constraints 0 1te≤ ≤ and 0 1tτ≤ ≤ ,  we can derive the 
best response function of each generation, that is,  
 1max 0, 1
2t t
γe
τ
⎧ ⎫⎛ ⎞⎪ ⎪= −⎨ ⎬⎜ ⎟⎪ ⎪⎝ ⎠⎩ ⎭
, (9) 
and 
 1max 0, 1
2t t
γτ
e
⎧ ⎫⎛ ⎞⎪ ⎪= −⎨ ⎬⎜ ⎟⎪ ⎪⎝ ⎠⎩ ⎭
, (10) 
where /γ v φA= . The equilibrium values of tτ  and te  are given by the intersection of (9) 
and (10).  Given that , [0,1]t tτ e ∈ , we can summarise these solutions as  
                      
0 if  
0 otherwise
t
t
τ γ
e
> >⎧⎪⎨⎪=⎩
,      and      
0 if
0 otherwise
t
t
e γ
τ
> >⎧⎪⎨⎪ =⎩
. (11) 
     These results merit some discussion. First of all, we see that corner solutions are possible 
and, as a result, 0t te τ= =  is an equilibrium. Evidently, this is due to the effect of the 
composite term γ  which stems, mainly, from the presence of the parameter v . The intuition 
is that, as long as 0v > , the marginal utility has a finite upper bound for zero values of te  or 
tτ . Therefore, such choices are possible due to the fact that utility may become 
monotonically decreasing in these arguments. Secondly, as indicated in (11), children will 
devote a positive level of effort or time in schooling only if they expect a minimum level of 
resources allocated to public education. Moreover, if positive, the effort on schooling 
depends negatively on v, the fraction of human capital transferred to the next generation 
without any effort, and positively on the efficiency of the schooling system (φ ) and the wage 
rate ( A ) (see equation 9). Thirdly, parents behave analogously (see equations 10 and 11). In 
particular, they require a minimum level of effort from the students, before they decide to 
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allocate a positive fraction of the existing resources on public education. This fraction, if 
positive, depends also negatively on v and positively on φ  and A .  
     As indicated above, additional interior solutions with both te  and tτ  being positive are 
possible as well, meaning that the model may actually admit multiple equilibria. The 
underlying cause of multiple equilibria in this framework is the strategic complementarity 
between the decisions of the two groups, which mutually reinforce one another (see Cooper 
and John, 1988). More specifically, as it can be seen form equations (9) and (10), a higher 
activity by one cohort of agents induces the other cohort to increase its activity as well. Once 
more, the presence of the parameter v  (which implies a positive γ ) is responsible for these 
effects. We can clearly see that when 0v =  ( 0γ = ), both solutions become invariant to each 
other. The intuition is that, for 0v = , the marginal utilities of both te  and tτ  depend only on 
the relative weights of the utility arguments that they ultimately affect (in this case, the 
arguments are equally weighted). When 0v > , however, the marginal utility of te  ( tτ ) is 
increasing in tτ  ( te ). Following increases in these variables, individuals will restore the 
equilibrium by taking the appropriate action so as to reduce their marginal utility – 
something they can do with an increase in te  ( tτ ) . In terms of intuition, a higher tax rate 
implies an increase in publicly provided education, therefore an increase in the benefits from 
devoting effort towards human capital accumulation. Similarly, a greater education effort by 
the young increases their parents’ marginal utility benefit of foregoing consumption and 
choosing a higher tax rate, a benefit that is due to the presence of the ‘warm-glow’ element 
in their preferences.  
       
                                                            Figure 1.  Multiple equilibria 
te  
tτ  0  γ
γ  
Lτ  Hτ  
Le  
He  
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     The situation described above is depicted in Figure 1. We can describe it, more formally, 
in 
 
Proposition 1. There exist at most three pure strategy equilibria. These are {0, 0} , { , }L Le τ  and 
{ , }H He τ  where,  
 
1 1 8
4
1 1 8
4
L
t
H
γ
e
e
γ
e
⎧ − −=⎪⎪⎪= ⎨⎪ + −⎪ =⎪⎩
. (12) 
and  
 
L L
t
H H
τ e
τ
τ e
=⎧⎪= ⎨⎪ =⎩
. (13) 
 
Proof: All proofs are relegated to the Appendix. 
 
     As long as 1/8γ <  (henceforth, a condition that we assume to hold) the results in (12) 
and (13) show that it is possible to get interior equilibria in addition to the corner solution.8 
The next step of our analysis is to examine whether the multiplicity of equilibria rests upon 
the presence of a coordination failure in the decision making process by the young and the 
old. In contrast to Glomm and Ravikumar (1995) and Palivos (2001), whose frameworks 
involve trade-offs that do not allow, in general, the Pareto ranking of equilibria, we can 
establish such ranking through  
 
Lemma 1. The three equilibria are ranked in the Pareto sense.  
 
     To complete the characterisation of the different equilibria, we need to address the issue 
of their stability. In other words, we need to consider whether small perturbations in the 
                                                 
8 The equality between the equilibrium values of te  and tτ  follows from the equal weights in the three 
arguments in the utility function (equation 1). For further details, see Palivos and Varvarigos (2009).  
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neighbourhood of each set of equilibrium choices will leave these choices unaffected or not. 
As it is known from the analysis of Cooper and John (1988), not all possible equilibria of a 
coordination game are unresponsive to such perturbations, as one of them may be locally 
unstable. In our model, such an equilibrium is represented by the point { , }L Le τ . This 
becomes evident from the fact that / 0Le γ∂ ∂ >  and / 0Lτ γ∂ ∂ >  – results that are 
completely at odds with the nature of the best-response functions in (9) and (10). If 
anything, we would expect that both cohorts choose lower values when the composite 
parameter term γ  is higher, as they actually do at { , }H He τ . Thus, the point { , }L Le τ  
represents nothing else but a threshold which, in conjunction with agents’ expectations of 
how others will act, determines which of the two stable equilibria – i.e., {0, 0}  or { , }H He τ  – 
will prevail. For example, consider that each cohort makes a choice x , where ,x e τ= . If one 
cohort expects the other to choose Lx x<  ( Lx x> ), then it will choose 0 ( Hx ). 
Anticipating this, the other cohort will choose 0 Lx<  ( H Lx x> ), thus verifying the initial 
expectation. 9   
 
3.2   Further Implications  
As we have seen, when decisions by the young and the old within a given period are strategic 
complements, and in the presence of a coordination failure, the model can generate multiple 
equilibria. Moreover, what is particularly interesting with our analysis is the idea of output 
growth indeterminacy that arises because any of the two equilibria can prevail: for a given 
tH , next period’s human capital (which, in equilibrium, satisfies 1 1t th H+ += ) can take more 
than one possible values. The indeterminacy of equlibria, which, as argued intuitively above 
and shown formally in Sections 4 and 5 below, emerges because of the endogenous determination 
of public policy, has the following two additional implications.  
     Firstly, it results in indeterminacy of the growth rate of output and human capital, since 
1 1/ / .t t t t t tY Y H H v ωe τ+ += = +  Thus, our paper belongs to the strand of literature that 
                                                 
9 Notice that this notion of instability differs from the one applied in variables that display an explicit dynamic 
pattern. More formally, let ( )t te f τ= and Φ( )t tτ e=  denote the best-response function of the children and the 
parents, respectively, when , 0.t te τ >  A (Nash) equilibrium is said to be stable if, starting from any point in its 
neighbourhood, the adjustment process in which players take turns myopically playing a best response to each 
other’s current strategies converges to the equilibrium. This requires that 1(Φ ) ,f −′ ′<  which, using (9) and 
(10), is equivalent to 1/ 4.τ > Hence, { , }L Le τ is unstable and { , }H He τ is stable.  
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illustrates the stylised fact of ‘club’ convergence, without resorting to the problematic 
scenario in which growth/development paths depend on initial conditions or endowments – 
problematic in the sense that the suggestion that some countries are currently rich simply 
because they happened to be rich before does not appear to be historically accurate. Other 
analyses that arrive to similar conclusions, but under different settings, are those of Redding 
(1996) and Palivos (2001). In the former, strategic complementarities between workers and 
entrepreneurs imply that, over some range of parameter values, multiple growth equilibria 
may emerge. In the latter, the complementarities generated by the existence of family-size 
norms imply indeterminate fertility choices and, given the trade-off between child-rearing 
and educational attainment, multiple growth equilibria. 
     The second significant implication of indeterminacy is that the growth rate of output may 
not settle down to a balanced growth path, instead its behaviour may display a periodic 
pattern. In fact, any of the two equilibria { }0, 0  and { },H He τ  may prevail during each 
distinct period [0, )t ∈ ∞ .10 We can formalise this argument with  
 
Proposition 2. The growth rate of output may not be balanced, instead it may be volatile as it is given by 
1 1ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( , ) / /t t t t t t t t tη η e τ Y Y H H v ωe τ+ +≡ = = = + , where ˆ ˆ{ , } {0, 0}  t te τ = or ˆ ˆ{ , } { , }t t H He τ e τ= , for 
any 0t ≥ . 
 
     The idea of volatile growth is absent from the analysis of Redding (1996) because he 
employs a framework in which the economy terminates at the end of the second period, 
implying that interactions among agents occur only once: consequently, multiple equilibria 
cannot be considered as a sign of periodic fluctuations in economic activity. In this respect, 
our framework shares more similarities with the analysis of Palivos (2001) in the sense that 
both employ full-fledged dynamic settings which allow interactions between agents to occur 
                                                 
10 An important feature that leads to the emergence of multiple equilibria is the assumption that individuals 
decide optimally on how much time or effort they devote towards learning activities. Some may argue that the 
introduction of compulsory schooling may invalidate this idea, in which case multiple equilibria (and growth 
volatility) disappear. However, there are strong arguments against this conjecture. First, even if attendance to 
some basic education (schooling) is mandatory, there are always elements in the education system that are not 
compulsory (e.g., higher education). Second, even if someone interprets te  in the narrow sense of  ‘schooling’ 
(which we do not), there are still qualitative characteristics that justify our approach: although individuals may 
have to spend a fixed amount of time at school, how much effort they are going to devote during their studies 
is an element of their own decision making process. The large differences in performance among pupils is 
certainly not an outcome related solely to innate abilities, therefore the element of personal effort is still crucial.   
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at every distinct period. Like we do in this paper, he recognises that multiplicity and 
indeterminacy are sources of growth volatility. In a framework which is closer to ours, 
Glomm and Ravikumar (1995) also discuss the possibility of cycles due to the presence of 
multiple equilibria. In their model, these arise (under some parameter specifications) because 
the future tax rate, which depends on future income, affects current education decisions 
which, partially, determine future income due to the accumulation of human capital.    
     Notwithstanding these common equilibrium implications, our particular framework 
offers new dimensions in two different respects: firstly, in the type of interactions that 
generate these effects and, secondly, in the implications for public policy. The latter issue is 
particularly pertinent, that is why we discuss it and analyse it formally in the subsequent part 
of our paper. 
 
4   Equilibrium with Partial Commitment  
Given that the equilibria are Pareto-ranked, there is a clear scope for government 
intervention that will induce the selection of the “high growth/high welfare” equilibrium, 
represented by the pair { },H He τ . Nevertheless, the preceding analysis has shown that the 
underlying source of indeterminacy and, therefore, growth volatility is inherently linked to 
the endogenous determination of public policy itself. For this reason, it may be instructive to 
seek a more institutional-oriented arrangement that could act as the desired selection 
mechanism.   
     As it will transpire from the following analysis, such an institutional mechanism exists. 
Suppose that, irrespective of the choices made by voters (which may approximate the 
ideological stance of different political parties), the government commits a minimum 
fraction (0,1)s ∈  of the economy’s output for public education expenditures. Given the 
other assumptions of the model, s  is also the minimum tax rate that adults will pay 
irrespective of their choices. However, they may choose to vote for a tax rate which is higher 
than s . Denoting this incremental tax (i.e., the increment over s ) that adults may vote for by 
tq , and given that the total amount of tax revenues supports public expenditures towards 
the formation of human capital, the lifetime utility function is now given by   
 1 1
2 1 1 1 1 1
ln(1 ) ln{(1 ) [ ( ) ]}
      ln{ [ ( ) ]}.
t
t t t t t t t t
t t t t t t
u e s q w vH φe s q w H
w vH φe s q w H
+ +
+ + + + + +
= − + − − + +
+ + +  (14)  
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     It should be noted here that a scenario in which governments commit to the provision of 
a certain fraction of GDP or of tax revenue towards education spending is not just a 
theoretical construction; instead there are instances where such mechanisms have been 
actually implemented. For example, Section 8 of Article XVI of the California state 
constitution, added by Proposition 98 of 1988, establishes a minimum funding level or 
guarantee for K–12 education and community colleges (Leyden, 2005). 
     Now, the lifetime utility in (6) is replaced by the one in (14). Following the same steps as 
before, it is straightforward to establish that the best response functions are given by   
 1max 0, 1
2t t
γe
s q
⎧ ⎫⎛ ⎞⎪ ⎪= −⎨ ⎬⎜ ⎟+⎪ ⎪⎝ ⎠⎩ ⎭
, (15) 
and 
 1max 0, 1 2
2t t
γq s
e
⎧ ⎫⎛ ⎞⎪ ⎪= − −⎨ ⎬⎜ ⎟⎪ ⎪⎝ ⎠⎩ ⎭
. (16) 
Solving (15) and (16) simultaneously, we find that te  is the same as the one given by (12), 
while      
 
L L
t
H H
q τ s
q
q τ s
= −⎧⎪= ⎨⎪ = −⎩
, (17) 
where,  Lτ  and Hτ  are given in (13). Thus, the results in (12) and (17) allow us to derive  
 
Proposition 3. As long as ( ),L Hs τ τ∈ , there exists a unique equilibrium  { , }H He q . Consequently, 
the growth rate of the economy is balanced and equal to 1 1ˆ ˆ( , ) / /t t t t tη η e τ Y Y H H+ +≡ = =  
( ).H Hv ωe s q= + + Furthermore, it is H Hs q τ+ = .  
 
     The preceding analysis shows that an institutional arrangement that commits a sufficient 
fraction of output towards public education can act as an efficient mechanism that will 
induce the coordination towards a unique equilibrium. In particular, the equilibrium selected 
will replicate the “high growth/high welfare” equilibrium which we derived in a preceding 
part of our analysis. The equilibrium is illustrated in Figure 2. 
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      This result is quite intuitive. A sufficiently high s  will induce the young to choose a 
relatively high effort towards learning activities. The adult voters recognise this and respond 
optimally by choosing a positive increment over the minimum tax rate s . This choice 
induces even higher levels of learning effort by the young. Thus, it verifies the adults’ 
expectations that induced them to support public education through a sufficiently high 
overall tax rate. 
 
                                                            Figure 2.  Unique equilibrium 
 
4.1   Public Education Spending and the Relation between Growth and 
Volatility   
Due to its ability to induce the selection of the “high growth/high welfare” equilibrium, the 
commitment to a sufficiently high share of public education can also eliminate growth 
volatility. Therefore, the structural characteristics pertaining to the endogenous 
determination of public spending on education may allow us to derive a novel explanation 
for one of the most pervasive macroeconomic facts, i.e., the relation between output growth 
and its volatility. 
     Despite the fact that some early economists conjectured that temporary and long-term 
movements in economic activity are inherently linked, it is only recently that a growing body 
of literature considered the analysis of the fundamentals behind this link as a research 
question worth pursuing. This strand of literature was further stimulated by an increasing 
number of empirical analyses (see footnote 3) showing that growth rates are significantly – 
and, mainly, inversely – correlated, on average, with proxies of their variability. Until 
recently, theoretical studies have explored this issue with the construction and solution of 
te  
tq  0   
/(1 2 )γ s−  
 
Hq  
0.5(1 / )γ s−  
He  
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stochastic endogenous growth models – i.e., models in which (extrinsic) uncertainty is 
introduced through the incorporation of some RBC-type real and/or monetary shocks in 
frameworks that endogenise the process of productivity improvements. As a result, in 
models such as those of Turnovsky (2000), Blackburn and Pelloni (2004), Chatterjee et al., 
(2004)  and Varvarigos (2007), the decisions governing the formation of the reproducible 
factor of production (be it physical or human capital) respond optimally to the realisation of 
stochastic shocks, therefore the average growth rate is affected by the volatility of these 
shocks. Using such frameworks, the authors have examined how exogenous variations in policy 
parameters affect both the average growth rate and its volatility.    
     Our analysis can be viewed as providing an alternative suggestion – mainly, the idea that 
both differences in growth rates and the incidence of growth volatility are inherently linked 
to the structural characteristics of endogenously determined economic policy. On the one hand, 
growth volatility is an outcome related to the manner through which public policy is 
endogenously determined; on the other hand, such volatility may be eradicated by an 
institutional mechanism that commits some fraction of the economy’s output towards public 
education spending. We outline the main implication from this idea in  
 
Proposition 4. There is a negative correlation between volatility and growth, in the sense that the average 
growth rate of the economy that may undergo fluctuations is lower than the average growth rate of the economy 
in which a minimum commitment eliminates these fluctuations. That is, ˆ( ) ( )tE η E η<  . 
 
     Contrary to the existing literature, our model does not rely on exogenously introduced 
random shocks so as to generate growth volatility. Rather, it is the intrinsic uncertainty that 
is inherent in strategically complement decisions, when these are subjected to coordination 
failure, which is responsible for growth volatility.11 When the structural characteristics of the 
economy render such failures absent, variability disappears and the complementary actions 
by agents are conducive to the formation of human capital. Given that elements of public 
                                                 
11 A recent contribution by Wang and Wen (2006) also examines the relation between endogenously driven 
cycles and growth. They do so in a completely different setting however. In their model, imperfectly 
competitive firms set prices one period in advance. Given that the decisions by firms within the industry are 
strategic complements, each one faces extrinsic uncertainty concerning its competitors’ actions – uncertainty 
which can be self-fulfilling and, thus, lead to sunspot equilibria. They show that, under certain parameter 
restrictions, the mean growth rate of an economy perturbed by sunspot shocks is lower than the growth rate of 
an economy in which sunspot shocks do not emerge.       
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policy are embedded to these structural characteristics, our framework suggests that a 
macroeconomic phenomenon – that is, the correlation between output growth and its 
volatility – may be attributed to issues pertaining to the field of public economics.    
     What needs to be stressed at this point is that although we provide an alternative 
explanation to that of the aforementioned analyses of stochastic endogenous growth, we do 
not view these different suggestions as being mutually exclusive. Rather, we view our result 
as complementary to existing ones given that nothing precludes the possibility that the 
relation between growth and volatility nests factors that relate to both exogenous shocks and 
failures of coordination. So far, the existing empirical literature has not provided a definite 
answer on which type of framework is more appropriate in identifying the underlying forces 
that govern the relation between economic growth and macroeconomic volatility. However, 
existing empirical studies have actually shown that models including coordination failures 
can be successful in capturing pervasive stylised facts of actual business cycles – see for 
example, Cooper and Haltiwanger (1996). Such evidence provides definite support for our 
result’s validity in suggesting a complementary explanation for the existence of a relation 
between volatility and output growth.   
 
5   Outcomes with Full Commitment   
So far, our formal analysis has been based on a scenario where choices by both the young 
and the old are formed through some type of coordination game. In this Section, we will 
reconsider these interactions under an alternative set-up. In particular, we will examine cases 
in which one of the two cohorts acts as a Stackelberg leader in the game that determines the 
optimal choices.    
 
5.1   The Adult Voters as Leaders 
We shall assume that the old decide on the tax rate first and, following this announcement, 
the young decide on their education effort. Effectively, this scenario is conceptually similar 
to the one described in Section 4. In particular, the government (through the voting 
behaviour of the old) commits to the level of public education spending reflected in the 
chosen tax rate tτ .  
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     More specifically, this approach entails that we solve the problem of a young person in 
period t  so as to get her best-response function ( )t te f τ= . The old adults of generation 
1t −  will take account of this when choosing their preferred tax, tτ ; therefore, the effort 
level chosen  by the young will be ( )t te f τ=  . Maximising (1) with respect to te  yields  
 1
1
t t t
t t t t t t
φτ w H
e vH φτ w H e
=− + . (18) 
Solving (18) for te  gives  
 1 1
2t t t
ve
φτ w
⎛ ⎞= −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
. (19) 
     Our next step is to substitute (19) into the 1t −  variant of the utility function given in (1). 
Eventually, we get  
 11 1 1 1 1 1ln(1 ) ln[(1 ) ( )] ln ( )2
t
t t t t t t t t t t t t
we τ w vH φτ w H e vH φτ w H+− − − − − −
⎡ ⎤− + − + + +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ . (20) 
Maximising (20) with respect to tτ  yields  
 1
1
t t
t t t t t
φw H
τ vH φτ w H
=− + . (21) 
Now, we can substitute tw A=  and /γ v φA=  in (21), and solve for tτ  to get  
 1
2t
γτ τ−= ≡  . (22) 
Finally, substituting (22) in (19) gives us  
 1 1 3
2 1t
γe e
γ
⎛ ⎞−= ≡⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠
 . (23) 
     As long as the previously imposed restriction 1/8γ <  still applies (which we assume it 
does), these solutions satisfy 1γ τ< <  and 1γ e< <  as required. Thus, we can present our 
next result in the form of  
 
Proposition 5. The equilibrium growth rate is equal to 1 1/ /t t t tη Y Y H H v ωτe+ +≡ = = +  , for every 
0t ≥ . 
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     It is evident that, in this scenario, the equilibrium is unique and the possibility of growth 
variability has disappeared. In terms of intuition, the intrinsic uncertainty that pertained 
choices when these were made through a coordination game has vanished. The old 
understand that an increase in the tax rate increases the willingness of the young to forego 
part of their leisure activities, simply because the benefits from doing so are higher. 
Consequently, they decide the tax rate that will induce children to provide the relatively high 
education effort that will satisfy their parents.  
      
5.2   The Young as Leaders 
Although it represents a less reasonable scenario, we shall briefly discuss the case where the 
young are the ones who commit to a certain effort towards learning activities. We do this 
purely as a means of illustrating the robustness of our main results regarding the implications 
of endogenous public policy. In terms of a concrete real-life example, we may think of 
scholarships and/or tuition fee waivers that are provided on the basis of students’ success on 
achieving some performance targets.  
     In this case, when the young choose te , they take account that Φ( )t tτ e= . Based on this, 
they choose their optimal learning effort te  which, subsequently, determines the chosen tax 
rate by adults through Φ( )t tτ e= . 
     Rewriting (1) in terms of 1tu −  and maximising with respect to tτ , we obtain the best-
response function   
 1 1
2t t t
v
τ
φe w
⎛ ⎞= −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
. (24) 
Next we substitute (24) in (1) and maximise with respect to te . We get  
 1
2t
γe e−= ≡ , (25) 
which, after substituting in (24), leads us to  
 1 1 3
2 1t
γ
τ τ
γ
⎛ ⎞−= ≡⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠
. (26) 
     The results in (25) and (26) indicate that, once again, the equilibrium and, therefore, the 
growth rate of output are uniquely determined. In terms of intuition, the young understand 
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that by foregoing some of their leisure will increase the adults’ benefit from foregoing part of 
their consumption, in order to support a higher tax rate. As a result, they devote the amount 
of learning effort that will provide adults with the incentive to choose relatively high public 
spending on education. Finally, since ,τ e τ e=   the growth rate in this case is the same as the 
one derived in Proposition 5.            
    Finally, a straightforward comparison between the result in Proposition 5 and the 
corresponding result in Proposition 1 allows us to establish  
 
Proposition 6. There is a negative correlation between volatility and growth, in the sense that the growth 
rate of the economy that may undergo fluctuations is always lower than the growth rate of the economy in 
which such fluctuations are absent. That is, ˆtη η<   t∀ . 
   
     Once more, the intuition for this outcome is related to the fact that, in the absence of 
coordination failure, indeterminacy disappears and complementary actions by agents are 
conducive to the formation of human capital. In fact, in this case we get an even stronger 
result: volatile growth rates are not only lower on average, but also at any moment in time.       
 
6   Conclusions  
In the preceding analysis, we have sought to analyse the implications from the fact that the 
education process entails coordination of the decisions made by distinct generations of 
agents. Among other results, we offered a novel explanation for the, empirically observed, 
negative correlation between volatility and growth. In particular, we argued that this may be 
due to the structural characteristics of the endogenous determination of public policy when 
this affects the accumulation of a growth promoting factor – in our case, human capital. 
Furthermore, our framework lies in the class of models that are able to explain convergence 
in ‘growth clubs’ without resorting to the idea of differences in initial conditions. In terms of 
policy implications, our analysis suggests that a credible policy of commitment towards 
growth promoting factors (such as education in our particular framework) could lead to both 
an increase in output growth and, as an added benefit, a reduction in the incidence of 
aggregate variability. 
 21
     As mentioned in the Introduction the intergenerational complementarities identified and 
analyzed in this paper seem particularly relevant in the case of public education. 
Nevertheless, in Palivos and Varvarigos (2010) we analyze the case of private education in a 
similar framework. There we show that in the case of private education there exists also an 
intergenerational externality, since when the young decide how much effort to devote on 
education, they realise that this decision will affect their future spending on their children’s 
education. Therefore, the parents’ learning effort depends on their children’s effort, which 
also depends on their own children’s effort and so on ad infinitum. In the end, because of 
the existence of indirect effects, it is not clear whether the decisions made by two 
consecutive generations are strategic complements. Moreover, the additional channel of 
interaction generates rich dynamics that may lead to periodic as well as aperiodic (i.e., 
chaotic) equilibria. Finally, in such a framework, the scope for Pareto-improving government 
intervention is limited.          
     Recently there has been a growing literature on the determination and the implications of 
public funding of education through voting (see Bearse et al. 2005, de la Croix and Doepke 
2009 and the references therein). In this literature there is some form of heterogeneity, 
which makes voting non-trivial. In addition, the parent’s utility typically depends on 
spending on her own consumption and on her children’s education. Nevertheless, the 
alternative specification, which is often used in the literature and adopted here, where some 
variant of the human capital of the children (be it the income or the services generated from 
it) enters the parental utility is equally plausible. The implications of this specification, 
especially in the presence of the aforementioned intergenerational complementarities, 
though interesting and potentially significant, remain largely unexplored. We view this as a 
fruitful avenue for future work.  
 
Appendix  
 
Proof of Proposition 1 
First, notice that the origin is an equilibrium, since it lies on both best response functions. 
Moreover, the best response function of the children, described by equation (9), is upward 
sloping and concave for tτ γ> , while that of the parents, equation (10), is upward sloping 
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and convex when solved in terms of te . Hence, the two curves can intersect at most twice. 
Next, substitute (10) in (9) and manipulate algebraically to derive the quadratic equation  
 2 1 0
2 2t t
γe e− + = ,  
whose solution is the one given by equation (12). Similarly, we can substitute (9) in (10) so as 
to get the quadratic equation  
 2 1 0
2 2t t
γτ τ− + = ,  
whose solution is given in equation (13).   ■ 
 
Proof of Lemma 1 
Consider the utility of the old adult/parent during period t . Using (1), it can be written as 
 1 1( , ) Ψ ln(1 ) ln( )t tt t t t tu e τ τ v ωτ e
− −= + − + + , 
where ω φA=  and 1 1 1 1 1Ψ ln(1 ) 2 ln[ ( )]t t t t te AH v ωτ e− − − − −= − + + . We can also write the 
utility of the young adult/offspring during period t  as 
 ( , ) Ξ ln(1 ) ln( )t tt t t t tu e τ e v ωτ e= + − + + , 
where 1 1 1 1Ξ ln(1 ) 2 ln[ ( )]
t
t t t tτ AH v ωτ e+ + + += − + + . Using the results in (12) and (13) we get 
 
3 1 8 3 1 8
1 1 ,  1 1
4 4L L H H
γ γ
e τ e τ
+ − − −− = − = − = − = , 
and   
 
( ) ( )2 21 1 8 1 1 8
,  
16 16L L H H
γ γ
τ e τ e
− − + −= = . 
Taking account of these results, we can show that 1 1( , ) ( , )t tH H L Lu e τ u e τ
− −>  and 
( , ) ( , )t tH H L Lu e τ u e τ>  as long as  
 
( )
( )
2
2
16 1 1 83 1 8
3 1 8 16 1 1 8
v ω γγ
γ v ω γ
+ + −+ − <− − + − −
. 
After some extensive algebra, the last expression reduces to  
 1/ 2,γ <  
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which holds. Thus, 1 1( , ) ( , )t tH H L Lu e τ u e τ
− −>  and ( , ) ( , )t tH H L Lu e τ u e τ>  hold 
simultaneously. With this result in mind, it is sufficient to show that 1 1( , ) (0, 0)t tL Lu e τ u
− −>  
and ( , ) (0, 0)t tL Lu e τ u>  so as to prove that the equilibria are Pareto ranked. Both of these 
inequalities are satisfied as long as  
( )2
3 1 8 16
4 16 1 1 8
γ v
v ω γ
+ − >
+ − −
, 
holds. Some algebraic manipulation can reduce this expression to  
 2 2(1 6 ) (1 8 )(1 2 )γ γ γ− > − − ⇒  
 30 32γ> − , 
which, of course, holds with a positive γ . In conclusion, (0, 0) ( , ) ( , )j j jL L H Hu u e τ u e τ< <  
for 1,j t t= −  and for every 0t ≥ .   ■ 
 
Proof of Proposition 2 
The proof regarding the volatility of the growth rate of output follows from the absence of 
any intertemporal element in each cohort’s choices, as it is obvious from equations (9) and 
(10). The value of the growth rate of output and its equality with that of human capital can 
be seen immediately from equations (2), (3), (5) and t th H= .   ■ 
 
Proof of Proposition 3 
Given the result in (17) and the non-negativity constraint in tq , it is obvious that 0Lq = . 
Thus, to prove the result, it is sufficient to show that an equilibrium with 0tq =  and 
1 1
2t
γe
s
⎛ ⎞= −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  cannot exist. This will be the case if  
 1 1 2 0
12 1
2
t
γq s
γ
s
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥= − − >⎢ ⎥⎛ ⎞⎢ ⎥−⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
 
or, equivalently,  
 2
1 2
s γ γ
s s
− > − . 
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The above inequality can be equivalently expressed as ( ) 0k s < , where  
 2( )
2 2
s γk s s= − + . 
Obviously, it is (0) 0k > , 12
2
k s′ = −  (which can be either positive or negative) and 
2 0k′′ = > . Furthermore, there are two roots satisfying ( ) 0k s =  and these are given by 
 1 2
1 1 8 1 1 8
   and   
4 4
γ γ
s s
− − + −= = . 
 Therefore, for 1 2( , )s s s∈ , it is ( ) 0k s <  and 0tq > . Consequently, as long as 1 2( , )s s s∈ , we 
conclude that an equilibrium with 0tq =  and 1 12t
γe
s
⎛ ⎞= −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  does not exist.   ■  
 
Proof of Proposition 4 
Let us compute the average growth rates we derive in both cases, over a number of periods 
T . For the case where a unique equilibrium is selected, the growth rate is balanced therefore 
 0( ) ( )
T
t
H H
η
E η η v ωe s q
T
== = = + +
∑   . 
However, for the case with multiple equilibria, the growth rate during a particular period 
may be either 0ˆtη η v= =  or ˆt H H Hη η v φωe τ= = + . Now, let us assume that the equilibrium 
pair { },H He τ  prevails in only a fraction (0,1)π ∈  of the total number of periods spanning 
from 0t =  to t T= . This implies that a number of (1 )π T−  periods will see the selection of 
the equilibrium pair { }0, 0 . The average growth rate is thus equal to 
 
0
00
ˆ
(1 )ˆ( ) (1 )
T
t
t H
t H H H
η
π Tη πTηE η π η πη v πωe τ
T T
= − += = = − + = +
∑
. 
From our existing results, we know that Hη η=   because H Hs q τ+ = . Therefore, 0η η<  . 
Hence, comparison of the two average growth rates reveals that ˆ( ) ( )tE η E η<  .   ■   
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Proof of Proposition 5 
The proof follows immediately from equations (2), (4) and the equilibrium condition 
.tw A t= ∀   ■ 
 
Proof of Proposition 6 
Given our analysis and results so far, it suffices to show that H He τ eτ<  . It is  
 
2
1 1 8 1 2 1 8 1 8
4 16H H
γ γ γ
e τ
⎛ ⎞+ − + − + −= =⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
, 
and  
 1 1 (1 ) 1
2 1 2 4
γ γ γeτ
γ
⎛ ⎞− 3 − − 3= =⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠
 . 
Then, for H He τ eτ<   we want  
 
1 2 1 8 1 8 1 4 (1 ) 0,
16 4
γ γ γ
γ γ
+ − + − −3< ⇒ + >  
a condition that is indeed true. Therefore, we conclude that ˆtη η<  .   ■ 
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